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Abstract 
 
 
The funding of civil society has become a key aspect of the governance agenda for 
international aid. This arises out of a number of theories linking civil society to better 
governance through the leveraging of social capital. These theories find their genesis in a 
distinctly liberal body of work that has drawn its findings from Western historical 
experience. In particular, the work of Robert Putnam and many like him in the 1990's 
draws its inspiration from Alexis d'Tocqueville's observations of democratic life in the 
early nineteenth century United States. Here, civic associational, according to Tocqueville, 
played a key part in the vibrant democratic spirit of the USA. Putnam's own findings, on 
the difference between governance outcomes in Southern and Northern Italy, mirror those 
of Tocqueville.  
Although the formulations of civil society and social capital inherent in this liberal 
tradition are but one among many theories, they are the ones that have influenced the 
international donors and the allocation of development assistance money has reflected this. 
Civil society funding generally goes to ideal types of organisations that most resemble a 
Western conception of civil society. In particular, Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGO's) have proliferated to take advantage of this.  
This may well be overlooking many key forms of civil society that already exist in 
developing countries. A liberal reading of civil society that focuses on the associative 
values of civil society organisations would miss groups that are characterised more by kin, 
ethnicity or tribal ties. The fa'asamoa (or 'Samoan way') is an example of just such an 
institution that may be viewed as too traditional and backward looking by liberal theory, 
but upon reflection performs many of the key roles ascribed to civil society including as an 
important provider of social capital. It could be that donors concerned with good 
governance would do better to further engage with traditional institutions such as the 
fa'asamoa, than to simply create a new class of civil society, dominated by NGO's over the 
top of existing social structures. 
 
 
Keywords: civil society, social capital, good governance, democracy, cultural specificity, 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to critically approach civil society's role in the good governance 
agenda for international development assistance. The central argument is that behind the 
good governance agenda for civil society, and its role as a creator of social capital, lie a set 
of theories that are based on Western thought and historical experience. This becomes 
problematic when that agenda is bought to the developing world as a supposed panacea for 
governance ills. The usual realisation of this is further funding for non-governmental 
organisations (NGO's) in developing countries, but many negative effects of this have been 
observed. In particular, the stifling of genuine grassroots activity and traditional forms of 
civil society that do not reflect what Western liberal theory dictates civil society ought to be. 
The fa'asamoa, or Samoan way, is an example of a form of traditional civil that is 
overlooked, yet has a lot to offer in terms of values, norms, strong social networks and as a 
provider of social capital. With this apparent cultural bias, the good governance agenda for 
civil society may be harming rather than helping the growth of 'social capital' and other 
perceived advantages for the facilitation of better governance. Therefore, a wider and less 
value-laden view of civil society needs to become the norm. 
 
1.1 The Rise of Civil Society and the Governance Agenda 
 
Since the early 1990's, international development agencies and aid donors have become 
increasingly interested in the issue of governance. Most major institutions, whether based in 
central government or in civil society, attempt to tackle issues of governance as part of their 
major strategy frameworks. Over the last fifteen years, a large pert of that agenda has 
increasingly been financial support for civil society.1  
It is not a coincidence that governance leaped to the top of the international development 
agenda in the early 1990's. With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the break-up of the Soviet 
Union, the Cold War that had dominated international politics for the past forty years had 
come to an end. During the Cold War, the interests of international geopolitics dominated 
development in the so called "third world". National governments held a large amount of 
                                                 
1
 Carothers, T and Ottaway, M (2002) Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and Democracy Promotion, Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C., USA, pg 3. 
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negotiating power with western governments and western government backed donor 
agencies. Their ability to change sides in the ongoing confrontation meant that they could 
squeeze concessions out of the richer nations, and accept aid that was beneficial to the 
government, though not always beneficial to the wider development needs of the country. 
Western (and Eastern) governments were only too happy to pander to the needs of the 
current regime in many developing countries by not 'rocking the boat' and questioning the 
efficacy of these regimes in the field of economic and human development, or try to stamp 
out the corruption that pervaded many of these regimes, and which only made development 
efforts all the more difficult. The shift to the governance agenda represented the foreign 
policy of Western governments “de-linking” from security objectives.2 
The privileged position of regimes in the developing world had ended. For the first time 
there was a general consensus throughout the developed world about how governments and 
economies should be organised. This has been dubbed the “Washington consensus” although 
that term is more widely used when describing the apparent 'consensus' in the realm of 
prescribed economic policy.  
This had the effect of enabling donors and agencies from the West to approach the issue of 
governance in the developing world, and to include it as a central part of their strategies. 
“Good Governance” was the term used to describe this new strategy. It involved mainly the 
construction of good, lasting, democratic institutions. Accountibility, free and fair elections, 
effective leadership, and participation were all central pillars to this new paradigm.  
This coincided with what has been hailed as the “Third Wave” of democratisation around the 
world. Identified by Samuel P Huntington, this term described the wave of democratisation 
that swept the developing world between 1974 and 1992.3 Southern Europe, Latin America 
and finally, the countries of the old communist bloc were among the main movers.  
The era also saw a number of broad generalisations about the future of political organisation 
in light of this apparent triumph of democracy. Most famously, this was put forward in 
Francis Fukuyama's article, 'The End of History?',4 in which he claims that liberal 
democracy had won a kind of 'battle of ideas' against other ideologies. The presumptive 
subtext being that it was now an historical imperitive that this form of political organisation 
should now be spread to all parts of the world that it was not currently present. 
Although the idea of civil society has existed for centuries, the term took on new importance 
in the 1990's when a series of theoretical works linked the presence of civil society to 
                                                 
2
 Carothers and Ottaway, pg 5. 
3
 Huntington, S. P. (1992) The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, University of Oklahoma 
Press, Oklahoma, USA. 
4
 Fukuyama, F (1989) 'The End of History?', The National Interest, No.16. 
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healthy democracies. It has since become widely used by both theorists and donors. This is 
due in part to the percieved failure of good governance strategies up to the 1980's, and the 
failure of implementation of certain economic policies, such as the Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAP's) and the devastating economic consequences this wrought. In Africa, 
the 1980's are known as the 'lost decade' for development.  
For many, the idea of civil society and associated ideas such as social capital are the 'missing 
link' in thinking about governance. Most donors in the world, from governmental donors to 
international non-governmental organisations (NGO's) now have 'civil society strengthening' 
projects in the countries they operate. The “strengthening” of civil society, often, is seen as a 
good governance objective rather than a means to an end. 
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1.2 Structure of the Thesis 
 
This thesis will divide its argument into three sections. The next chapter will explore the 
theory behind civil society's role in the governance agenda. It will look at what, according to 
liberal theorists, civil society is supposed to do. It will look in particular at its role in 
leveraging social capital and how that is supposed to help in terms of wider governance 
objectives. It will also look into other theories or conceptions of both concepts (civil society 
and social capital) in order to single out the specific liberal prescription most famously 
identified with Robert Putnam as but one among many theories. It will also look at particular 
formulations of these concepts that could perhaps prove more useful in an analytical sense. 
The third chapter will look at the way the good governance agenda is being carried out in the 
developing world, and some of the problems associated with civil society's role in that 
agenda. It will look at an empirical example of why the civil society 'panacea' is perhaps not 
the best idea for many parts of the developing world. It will then look into the proliferation 
of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO's) which benefit from increased funding in 
governance aid. It will look at observed negative externalities of the central position NGO's 
have adopted, including the under representation of indigenous forms of civil society, and 
suggest a third way approach to civil society in the developing world as being more 
appropriate. 
The fourth chapter will focus on Samoa, and in particular the institution of the fa'asamoa 
(the Samoan way). The central argument will be that the fa'asamoa is a good example of an 
indigenous form of civil society. It performs tasks ascribed to civil society such as interest 
aggregation and articulation, but more importantly, it acts as an important provider of social 
capital. It facilitates trust and reciprocity in Samoan society, acts as an important social 
network through which individuals gain assistance from others and therefore access to social 
resources. The fa'asamoa is an example of an institution that liberal theory would not class 
as civil society, yet which provides many of the benefits that liberal theory ascribes to civil 
society through affective rather than associative ties. The chapter also looks at Samoan and 
Pacific thought where it pertains to many of these themes. 
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Chapter Two: Civil Society and Social Capital in the 
Theoretical Literature 
 
2.1 Defining Civil Society 
 
One of the problems with the concept of civil society is that it can be notoriously difficult to 
define. Scholars writing about the concept often have to provide a definition of their own 
that suits their needs. The task of this chapter is to look at the way in which the concept has 
been written about and used by theorists and practitioners; it will not put forward its own 
definition. Rather, it will present the most commonly used and referred to ideas about civil 
society (identified as the 'liberal' conception) as well as some other traditions that 
occasionally come to the fore. This section, therefore, will discuss some of the relevant 
problems found in attempts at a definition, and provide some of the most used definitions to 
be found in the literature.  
The London School of Economics (LSE) Centre for Civil Society defines civil society as: 
“the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values... [It 
is] distinct from... the state, family and market, though in practice, the boundaries between 
state, civil society, family and market are often complex, blurred and negotiated... Civil 
societies are often populated by organisations such as registered charities, development non-
governmental organisations, community groups, women's organisations, faith-based 
organisations, professional associations, trades unions, self-help groups, social movements, 
business associations, coalitions and advocacy groups”.5 
While this definition is unusually detailed, it is typical in that it defines civil society as a 
sector of the wider society defined by associational groups which exist outside micro groups 
such as families, or macro political entities such as tribes or nations. It also exists outside of 
the market and is therefore readily identified by not-for-profit organisations. Importantly, it 
does make allowances in its description of the lines between civil society, the state and the 
market as blurred. This is an empirical observation, however, and the gist of the piece 
suggests that ideally, civil society forms a separate entity to the state and the market. This 
conception of civil society is typical of liberal readings, which as shall be seen below, 
exclude the family and related kinship groups, and defines civil society as something which 
provides an 'antidote' to the state and is therefore distinct and separate. As shall also be seen 
                                                 
5
 London School of Economics, What is Civil Society?, 
(http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CCS/what_is_civil_society.htm), accessed 14/04/2008. 
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below, these ideas can be somewhat problematic. 
Gordon White describes civil society as “an intermediate associational realm between state 
and family populated by organizations which are seperate from the state, enjoy autonomy in 
relation to the state and are formed voluntarily by members of the society to protect or 
extend their interests or values.”6 This definition is in the same vein as the LSE definition, 
although it is more at pains to separate civil society definitively from the state. It is 
important to note that the term 'associational' often appears in definitions of civil society, but 
it is usually qualified to limit itself to certain types of organisations. The associational 
element is also very important for liberal definitions of civil society, as it defines what it is 
civil society is supposed to do. Providing an associational realm in which good democratic 
values can be learned is, as shall be seen, the most important aspect of civil society 
according to this theoretical viewpoint.  
Various problems have been raised regarding attempts to define civil society. For instance, 
the two definitions above do not negate organisations whose aim is less than 'civil'. 
Voluntary associations that exist with the aim of inciting ethnic hatred would pass the test. It 
is an ongoing controversy as to whether these groups belong to civil society, and in fact, 
how important the concept of 'civility' is in judging an organisation's qualification.  
The concept has blurry edges and this is made apparent when examining certain groups that 
may or may not be defined as part of civil society. For instance embryonic political parties 
that start life as voluntary organisations (many definitions exclude groups that seek political 
power), or groups that are in themselves voluntary but are co-opted by corporate entities for 
profit seeking ends, such as fake grassroots organisations (known as astro-turfs).  
In general though, definitions of civil society are necessarily broad. It is a contested subject 
and theorists and donors alike approach it in different ways. As Goran Hyden states: “most 
analysts... define civil society as the realm of organized social life standing between the 
individual and the state.”7 This chapter will begin by looking at civil society as it is seen by 
theorists belonging to the liberal tradition which sees civil society as a distinct entity from 
both the market and the state, and, in fact, has an anti-state role. The last part of the chapter 
will look into some alternative conceptions, also from Western philosophical traditions. 
 
 
                                                 
6
 White, Gordon (Autumn 1994) 'Civil Society, Democratization and Development (I): Clearing the Analytical 
Ground,' Democratization, vol. 1, No. 3, pg 379. 
7
 Hyden, G (1997) 'Civil Society, Social Capital, and Development: Dissection of a Complex Discourse', Studies in 
Comparative International Development, Vol. 32, No. 1, pg 13. 
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2.2 The Role of Civil Society 
 
The effects that civil society organisations (CSO's) are, according to the majority of the 
literature, supposed to have on the prospects for democracy can be broadly split into two 
camps. One is the 'social capital creating' role that came from the intellectual tradition based 
around Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, Robert Putnam, and the other theorists that came 
after him. The other, focuses on the more practical and observable effects that the civil 
society sector has on the political life of a country. This chapter will largely focus on the first 
of these two categories, civil society's social capital 'creating' role and the emphasis placed 
on this by liberal theorists. This section, however, will discuss some of the democracy-
enhancing roles that have been ascribed to CSO's and which fit into the second camp.  
In this area, the main defined role of civil society is to bring executive and legislative power 
to account. It is to play the part of the 'antidote to the state'.8 This is a very important role 
from a democratic (and 'good governance') point of view. Checks need to be made on 
governmental power to ensure their compliance to the rule of law, and to ensure the 
predictable and efficient running of government. In assessing the literature on civil society's 
role as a check against the state, Rollin Tusalem puts foward a number of specific points that 
have been made by various authors. Predominantly approaching the role of NGO's, and in 
particular, NGO's that work in the political arena, Tusalem finds that they can 'challenge 
abuses of executive or legislative authority', 'minimize arbitrary policies imposed by the 
state', 'expose forms of client/patron relationships or nepotism to the public', and compel 
state authorities to prosecute or penalize 'errant public officials'.9  
Aside from the more antagonistic roles towards the state as mentioned above, civil society 
can also act on a positive level. It can offer an alternative to state-led efforts to monitor the 
efficacy of legislation or the transparency of state institutions.10 On a wider social scale, civil 
society can also play positive democracy enhancing roles. It can offer a flow of information 
to the population regarding government policy or practice, and it can help in the articulation 
of demands or grievances by particular groups in society.11 In fact, one of the key roles 
ascribed to civil society is 'interest aggregation' and 'interest articulation', i.e. It can bring to 
the fore issues that might not otherwise warrant political attention, and garner support for 
                                                 
8
 Van Rooy, A & Robinson, M (2002) in Van Rooy, A (ed) Civil Society and the Aid Industry, Earthscan Publications 
Ltd., London, UK, pg 46. 
9
 Tusalem, Rollin (2007) 'A Boon or a Bane? The Role of Civil Society in Third -or Fourth- Wave Democracies', 
International Political Science Review, Vol. 28, No. 3, pg. 364. 
10
 Tusalem, pg 364. 
11
 Tusalem, pp 364-365. 
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particular issues by espousing them in the public arena. In this way it can help shape and 
sustain public debate about issues which affect people's lives. According to Tusalem's 
literature review, civil society can also 'promote social tolerance and diffuse ethnic 
rivalries'.12 All these things should lead to a more informed and empowered public that can 
make better democratic choices, and one which will, hopefully, play by the rules of the game 
for a more harmonious democratic environment.  
Many theorists writing about civil society, especially during the 1990's but it is also true 
today, are political scientists, and a great number of these are “transitologists” (i.e. they 
are involved in the study of democratic transitions, a branch of political science that rose to 
prominence during and after the transitions in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union). 
Larry Diamond is one such scholar. For Diamond, the “first and most basic functions of civil 
society” divide in to two areas, their purpose is to “to monitor and restrain the exercise of 
power by democratic states, and to democratize authoritarian states”.13 Therefore, civil 
society is defined by its objective which is to create, consolidate and uphold democratic 
regimes.  
Diamond set out ten essential functions of civil society.14 Some of these were to do with 
associational life and the teaching of specific norms which will be explored below, but other 
vital points emerged. As stated above, the first and foremost role of civil society is to limit 
the power of the state and to aid in democratisation. The next three deal with the benefits of 
associational life learned in civil society and the aggregation and articulation of interests. 
The fourth, related to Tusalem's point above about promoting social tolerance, claims that 
civil society can introduce new issues that cut across existing social cleavages, be they class 
based or ethnic. In this way they cause people to think beyond these cleavages, and engage 
more with political processes.15 
Another very important aspect is that civil society, or more specifically the organisations that 
make up civil society are an important recruiting and training ground for future political 
leaders. For some organisations this is their specific purpose, and they provide training 
programmes based around legal and political professions. Some organisations also have 
specific democracy building aims. Good examples of this are organisations that engage in 
non-partisan election monitoring. 
Two of Diamond's key points relate to the way civil society organisations can have an 
important role in disseminating information. Obviously, it is important for any democracy 
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 Tusalem, pg 364. 
13
 Diamond, L (1994) Toward Democratic Consolidation, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 5, No. 3, pg 7. 
14
 Diamond pp 7-11. 
15
 Diamond, pg 10. 
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that the citizens are informed and can make sound decisions, or that political leaders 
themselves are informed of issues that citizens find important. Diamond also extends this to 
include it as a key determinate of the success of long term structural economic changes, such 
as privatisation. A flow of information is needed because such long term changes can only 
be achieved in a sustainable way with the appropriate coalitions within society and the 
political scene. 
Diamond's last point addresses a positive role that civil society plays relating to the state. As 
civil society acts to improve the effectiveness and therefore legitimacy of the state, citizens 
gain respect for the state and its institutions and begin to positively engage with it, further 
entrenching good democratic practice.16 
The benefits of an active civil society to the prospects and sustainability of democratic 
systems can seem obvious. There are many examples, particularly from Eastern Europe 
where a vibrant civil society greatly assisted the transition to a democratic system, or the 
strengthening and deepening of an existing democracy. However it is not always so clear 
cut, and for many theorists the greater questions is not the more easily observed effects that 
civil society has on the political life of a country, but rather its effect on perceived deeper 
causes of democratic success or failure and institutional robustness. The chapter now turns 
to such a question with a review of the theoretical links between civil society and social 
capital. 
 
 
                                                 
16
 Diamond, pg 11. 
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2.3 Social Capital 
 
The link between social capital and civil society is now firmly established in the minds of 
development academics and political scientists. The concept of social capital provides a 
strong academic link between civil society and democratisation. This is due, first and 
foremost to the work of Robert Putnam, particularly his 1993 book “Making Democracy 
Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy”.17 This was the key work in forming an intellectual 
tradition regarding the prospects of democracy, which led to the greater importance of civil 
society in the eyes of academics and donors. It also helped precipitate the wide use of the 
term ‘social capital’. 
Social capital is much like civil society in that competing definitions can be found in almost 
every work on the subject. In its very essence it is a conglomerate of many different 
concepts. Ideas of trust, civic associationalism, and democratic behaviour all find their way 
into definitions of social capital.  
Theories about membership in voluntary organisations and the positive effect this has on 
democratic behaviour stretch back much further than Putnam. In 1963 Gabriel Almond and 
Sidney Verba published “The Civic Culture”18 which found that members of voluntary 
organisations are “more politically active, more informed about politics, more sanguine 
about their ability to affect political life, and more supportive of democratic norms”.19 
It wasn’t until the early 1990’s, however, that the debate became specifically framed around 
the concept of social capital. Robert Putnam’s 1993 book was a case study of regional 
politics in Italy. The central question of the book was why such a disparity existed between 
the north of Italy and the south in terms of political effectiveness. Why do local political 
bodies in the north perform better and are more successful in creating effective legislation 
than those in the south? 
His answer lay in the presence of far greater levels of social capital in the north. The 
differing political climate in the two regions was marked by much higher levels of civic 
associationalism and trust in the north. What this meant was that the political system in the 
north had the advantage of more politically active citizens that ensured interest and vitality 
in the political system, and also trust, not just between citizens but also in political leaders 
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 Putnam, R.D (1993) Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, New Jersey, USA. 
18
 Almond, G.A. & Verba, S. (1963) The Civic Culture, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, USA. 
19
 Stolle, Dietlind (Sep 1998) “Bowling Together, Bowling Alone: The Development of Generalised Trust in Voluntary 
Associations”, Political Psychology, Vol. 19, No. 3, Special Issue: Psychological Approaches to Social Capital, pg 
499. 
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and between political leaders. This results in a far reduced risk of politically motivated 
violence and corruption inside the political system itself.  
David Halpern creates a useful distinction between different forms of democracy in order to 
better explain the concept of social capital. Primary democracy describes small local 
communities coming together to decide things which are of importance to the community. 
Secondary democracy describes the (usually) representative democratic decision making 
that occurs at a national or regional level. Third, tertiary democracy belongs on the 
“meta” or theoretical level and is about how imagined societies might organise 
themselves.20 
The effects of social capital at a primary level are obvious. When small groups of people get 
together to decide on important issues, the key difference as to whether or not their meetings 
will be useful, and effective decisions are made, are those many things that are grouped 
together under the banner of social capital. If a high level of trust in present, there have been 
frequent past meetings, and information is freely exchanged between individuals, the 
chances of a useful and effective decision making process will be much greater than if 
people don't know each other well, or there are clashes in personality resulting in less trust 
and a more acrimonious atmosphere.21 
Essentially, the contention is that what is true at the primary level, is also true at the 
secondary level. Putnam describes a hypothetical community that is characterised by high 
levels of social capital, he calls it the 'civic community'.22 It is characterised by an active 
participation by its members in public affairs, and though its members may be motivated by 
self interest, it is a form of self interest which is defined in the context of broader public 
needs. Political equality is an important part of the community where horizontal relations of 
reciprocity and co-operation exist instead of hierarchical, vertical relations. Solidarity, trust 
and tolerance are very evident amongst the community members, although the community 
cannot be conflict free; there exists a tolerance and respect of conflicting opinions.  
Key to Putnam’s vision is a dense network of associations and social structures of co-
operation. Putnam sees associations as incubators of the norms and values important in a 
wider civic community, “civil associations contribute to the effectiveness and stability of 
democratic government, it is argued, both because of their 'internal' effects on individual 
members and because of their 'external' effects on the wider polity.”23 In this sense, it is 
possible to see an active and vibrant civil society as a form of training ground where 
                                                 
20
 Halpern, David (2005) Social Capital, Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, pg 171. 
21
 Halpern, pp 172-173. 
22
 Putnam, R.D (1993), pp 87-90. 
23
 Putnam, pg 89. 
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members of the public learn the values associated with social capital. 
Putnam is widely associated with the idea that civic associations, particularly voluntary 
associations, strengthen the civic community and therefore contribute to democracy. It was 
his famous assertion that bowling leagues help democracy in his 2001 work, “Bowling 
Alone: The Collapse and Revival of the American Community”.24 
 
2.3.1 Reciprocity and Trust 
 
But why is social capital important for an effective democracy? It is a widely held belief that 
politically active and well informed citizens are important for an active democracy and that 
in fact, legitimate democracy requires citizen participation.25 In this respect, the norms and 
values gained through participation in voluntary associations are vital, as are what 
associations themselves can offer the community. Associations that are formed around a 
certain interest can facilitate 'interest aggregation' and 'interest articulation'26 meaning that 
they can help bring issues to the public and set the terms of political debate.  
Outside of the realm of what civic associationalism can bring, two concepts stand out as 
being the most important when linking the idea of social capital, to its role in upholding and 
strengthening democracy, namely, reciprocity and trust. These two concepts are also the key 
variables used (usually) in measuring the presence of social capital in a given society. If the 
norms of trust and reciprocity are strongly present in society, it can be said that there is a 
high level of social capital. 
Both reciprocity and trust can be understood in the individual and general sense. That is, 
they both have meaning when explaining the acts of individuals, and the cohesive nature of 
society as a whole.  
Trust on an individual level is the presence of trust between individuals. In a society 
characterised by a high level of social capital, people tend to trust one another to not do 
them any harm, or to uphold their end of a transaction or contract. Where this norm is not 
present, individual agency can be hampered as shall be investigated below. Generalised trust 
describes a level of trust not just towards another individual, but towards many individuals, 
organisations and institutions that make up society. In particular, trust of political officials, 
including elected officials. In this sense it has a direct impact on the fortunes of democracy. 
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What is the point of voting for someone if you do not trust them to implement their avowed 
policies?  
Norms of reciprocity are often the result of high levels of trust. Reciprocity can also be seen 
on an individual and general level. Putnam makes the distinction between 'balanced' and 
'generalised' reciprocity.27 Balanced reciprocity describes a situation where there is a 
simultaneous exchange of items of equal worth. For instance, two farmers, one who has a 
surplus of eggs, might make a deal with the other farmer, who has a dairy farm, to supply 
him eggs in exchange for an equal value of milk. In this way they are benefitting each other 
by giving the other something they can easily afford in exchange for something they do not 
have or would otherwise have to buy elsewhere. Generalised reciprocity describes a 
situation that is present throughout society. People will give items to or provide services for 
other people without an expectation that they will be immediately 'repaid'. A general sense 
exists that one good turn deserves another, and that an act of charity towards another will be 
reciprocated in an undefined time, in an undefined way, and even to an unequal level. 
Therefore, when a persons neighbour goes on holiday, and he is asked to look after their pets 
while they are gone, he won't necessarily expect payment, or for the neighbours to do 
something for him immediately. Rather, not necessarily because of his actions but because of 
a generalised sense of reciprocity, he can reasonably expect his neighbours to be happy to do 
him a good turn when he needs it.  
It may well be self evident that generalised trust and reciprocity are good things. In areas 
where these norms are prevalent, people's lives would be much easier. There would exist a 
sense of social connectedness and the advantages that come with reciprocity. But why would 
they necessarily be good for democracy? Surely, the view exists that democracy is about 
competition, such that a general sense of reciprocity is not necessarily important. The real 
value that these norms present is in ensuring that the rules of the game are adhered to. There 
can exist plenty of competition, but what is to stop it erupting into conflict, perhaps even 
violent conflict? If norms of social trust and reciprocity are present, there is a mediating 
effect on extremes like violence, differences in opinion are accepted if not agreed with, and 
the perpetrator of violence or other anti-social acts would soon find themselves shut out of 
relationships of trust and reciprocity, in other words, they would find themselves without 
social capital.  
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2.3.2 The Free Rider Problem 
 
Importantly however, a large part of the value of the norms associated with social capital 
come into focus when analyzing a very important aspect of democracy, that of collective 
action. The presence of social capital, and civic associationalism, lets individuals discover 
how 'by working together, they can collectively achieve satisfactions that they cannot as 
individuals'.28 In fact, collective action, in the most common form it appears, i.e. within 
voluntary associations, is, according to Putnam, the most important training ground to create 
a virtuous cycle of social capital creation. The second part of this chapter will focus more on 
voluntary organisations or civil society organisations, but it is important to first explore how 
the presence of social capital can help facilitate civic associationalism, which will then 
reinforce the level of social capital and so on, completing the 'virtuous cycle' mentioned 
above. 
Political game theory has thrown into sharp relief many problems associated with collective 
action. In particular, they focus on the rewards and penalties faced by either co-operating 
with others, or defecting from that co-operation. Through this they gain an insight into the 
choices individuals face regarding collective action.  
The though experiment 'prisoners dilemma' is an example of one. In the scenario, two 
prisoners, who have both been arrested for the same crime, are interviewed separately. They 
are both told that if they both say nothing (i.e. Co-operate) they will both serve a six month 
sentence for a minor offence. If they both testify against the other (i.e. Defect) they will both 
serve a sentence for 5 years. If, however they choose different options, the one that co-
operated will serve 10 years, while the one that defected will be set free. From an individual, 
self-maximising position, there is only one option: Defect. The fact that they cannot know 
what the other has chosen means that to defect will probably give the best results for an 
individual, despite the fact that if they had both chosen to co-operate, the total combined 
sentence is only one year, and for every other option it totals 10 years.  
While this kind of thought experiment can be used in many different situations, it throws 
light on individual responses to collective action, and the 'free rider' problem that can occur 
because of it. Robert Putnam uses the example of rotating credit associations that exist in 
many parts of the world, especially poorer parts of the world, as a form of mutual aid. Each 
member of the association will put in a small amount of money every month (for instance), 
and the fund will slowly build up money. Each year, the entire fund is given to one of the 
contributors, and this large inflow of cash can help them with something that is very 
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expensive and beyond their usual means, i.e. to pay for a wedding celebration, make 
improvements to their land, or avert a crisis.  
The idea of rotating credit associations suffers, at least in theory (and sometimes in practice) 
from the free rider problem. The idea of a large payout will keep people in the scheme, but 
what will occur once they have received their payout and their turn won't come around again 
for a long time, yet they still have to pay a small amount each month?29  
Rotating credit associations only work well in areas characterised by high social trust. The 
existence of the association itself demonstrates the commitment present to norms of 
reciprocity. It also helps that generally, defectors in ventures of this nature are met with 
social ostracism, and the unlikelihood that they will be invited to take part in future mutual 
aid ventures.  
Even the prisoner’s dilemma looks more hopeful if we know that the two prisoners trust 
each other to not do harm to the other. As Fransisco Herreros says: “Trust is, after all, an 
expectation, a belief about the other players' strategies.”30 Similar situations are faced in the 
realms of economics and politics, and a generalised sense of trust is the glue which holds 
these systems together. There is no point in collective action, so important for a functioning 
democracy, if there is not a countervailing force, like the norms associated with social 
capital, acting against the free-rider problem.  
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2.4 Alternative Conceptions of Civil Society and Social Capital. 
 
So far in this chapter, a theoretical perspective has been put forward regarding the 
importance of a vibrant civil society to success in democratic governance. It has been argued 
that civil society, meaning the voluntary sector of society that exists between the level of the 
family and the level of the state, and not including the market, was the key agent for the 
creation of social capital. Social capital, in turn, meaning aggregate levels of certain norms, 
in particular 'trust' and 'reciprocity'. As in Putnam's analysis, higher levels of social capital 
mean a stronger change of deeply embedded democracy.  A 'virtuous circle' is created when 
these two concepts combine adding to the civic spiritedness of the populace. They provide 
the 'missing link' that has plagued theorists regarding the success of democratic institutions 
in some parts of the world as compared to others. 
 
2.4.1 Civil Society 
 
This has been the reading of social capital and civil society that has formed the bulk of the 
literature and that which has been adopted by the donor community. It is, however, not the 
only reading of the two concepts to be found in the literature. Civil society in particular has 
a very long history in Western political thought. It has its genesis in Eighteenth Century 
debates, and the differing positions have formed different philosophical traditions. Thinkers 
such as Rousseau, Locke, Thomas Paine, and or course Alexis d'Tocqueville all approached 
the subject. 
Geographically, conceptions of civil society have also been markedly different. In Latin 
America, civil society movements grew up largely in opposition to dictatorial regimes, much 
like they did in Eastern Europe. In Latin America, however, there was also a consensus that 
party politics had failed, and therefore civil society was conceptualised as standing in place 
of parties as well as being against a repressive state.31  
A distinctive radical European tradition is also evident. The themes that lie behind this 
tradition challenge the American assumption that “civil society, a strong democracy, and 
economic progress” are “conceptually or empirically connected in a unproblematic way.”32 
For instance, a common critique of liberal democracy is that it cements the power of the 
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already priveleged in society. It protects individual and particular interests and through the 
mechanism of elections every few years, it effectively limits mass participation. This 
tradition in fact encompasses the work of many NGO's around the world, whose aim is 
protecting the weak, and ensuring the have a voice in “defining the universal concerns that 
should then be actively promoted and implemented at higher levels of governance.”33 This 
tradition finds its genesis in the work of Rousseau who stressed the need to pursue the 
'common good' over particular interests.  
The idea of the 'common good' is similar to the idea of civil society as the 'good society'. In 
contrast to Putnam's associational ideal, Michael Edwards posits another strain of thought 
which sets the ultimate goal as not having a 'strong civil society' but rather a 'society that is 
strong and civil'. Edwards claims that the idea of civil society as a metaphor for the good 
society has roots in the Greek polis, and ideal religious communities such as the Islamic 
Ummah and the Jewish Tikkun Olam, as well as Kantian thinking about a global ethical 
community.34 Currently, it is espoused by many differing individuals and groups from all 
different political stripes, such as liberal democrats, the Global Justice Movement and 
Islamic traditionalists. Tolerance, non-discrimination, non-violence, trust and cooperation 
are common themes.35 
Another strand that has arisen comes from the Marxist tradition. Marx saw the civil sphere 
as providing an artificial equality. The true relationships in civil society were inequality and 
exploitation36 according to his ideas about capitalism. Antonio Gramsci identified civil 
society as “an arena where associations of different kinds can both disseminate the ideas that 
reinforce capitalism as well as dispute them”.37 This runs counter to the liberal ideal, where 
the existence of a strong civil society essentially supports individual rights and strengthens a 
liberal system of democracy. Capitalism is usually an essential ingredient of this.  
The liberal conception, in which civil society identified as voluntary associationalism 
leverages social capital thus providing a better democratic environment, has been coined 
“neo-Tocquevillian” after Alexis d’Toqceville’s observations of early nineteenth century 
America. It is a term used to distinguish this set of theories from the ones mentioned above. 
 
2.4.2 Social Capital 
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As stated previously, the road via which civil society has its greatest impact on the prospects 
for democracy in any given society, according to liberal theory, is through its role in social 
capital creation. With this in mind, it becomes essential to examine the concept of social 
capital as it is presented in Putnam's work, and look at alternative conceptions that might 
prove more useful in an analytical sense.  
The dominant view of social capital in the liberal conception, and particularly in Putnam's 
work sees social capital as an aggregate level of the norms of trust and reciprocity found 
within a given society. Inherent in this view is a path-dependant explanation of social capital 
and it's presence in particular societies. Michael Foley and Bob Edwards have argued of the 
need for a greater contextualisation of social capital within certain social structures.38 They 
contest that the effect of this will make social capital a more useful concept in examining 
social structures outside of Western culture, such as the examples in the coming chapter 
from the South Pacific. This in turn will allow for a more balanced approach to the question 
of civil society, and what it does towards progressing democracy in these contexts. 
The debate about the best way to conceptualise social capital and its efficacy in the process 
of democratic consolidation is an interesting debate, and, like the conceptualisation of civil 
society, it has its origins in different philosophical strands. The concept of social capital 
itself has been around for decades in different formulations. Pierre Bourdieu and James 
Coleman are generally credited with first popularising the concept in the 1980's. James 
Coleman in particular added new currency to the term within sociological research. He 
defined social capital by its function. It was conceived of as 'social-structural' resources that 
acted as a capital asset for individuals. According to Coleman, social capital consisted of a 
variety of different entities that had two things in common; they all “consist of some aspect 
of social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of individuals who are within the 
structure.”39  
This is markedly different from Putnam's approach, which emphasised the presence of 
certain norms on an aggregate level, rather than the access to social resources on an 
individual level. Michael Foley, Bob Edwards, and Mario Diani find that social capital, 
narrowly conceived in terms of trust and reciprocity as has been the case in much of the 
relevant academic discourse since the publication of Putnam's Making Democracy Work, is 
little more than a stand in for old 'political culture' variables and find that as an analytical 
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concept it is mostly a 'dead end'.40 They take the concept of social trust and find that there is 
little evidence that the presence of larger levels of social trust in a population has any 
bearing on democratic prospects of the country in question. In fact, they find that the 
presence of social trust is most likely to be seen as an effect of social, economic or political 
institutions that work well for some if not most of the population, rather than an underlying 
cause of effective political institutions.41 
Michael Foley and Bob Edwards in particular have long advocated the need to rethink social 
capital as a dependant variable that is conceived of in terms of particular social and political 
contexts, in other words to reintegrate context dependency into the debate. They argue that 
Putnam's conception of social capital fails to take into account the availability of access to 
social capital, or more accurately the raw social resources that can be used to facilitate group 
action, for different groups or individuals within society. Putnam's approach aggregates 
social capital as something that is either available or not available within a society. In their 
words: “The context dependency of social capital poses conceptual and methodological 
difficulties for analysts using it to explain the kinds of macro social, political and economic 
outcomes of interest to many political scientists and economists. In such analyses a perverse 
trade-off exists. The more bluntly one measures social capital and the higher the level of 
social organization characteristic of the process being explained, the more the model must 
posit that all social capital is of equal value and that all relationships (or networks, or 
associations) provide equal access.”42 
In reality, this is not the case. Within a given society, there exist many different groups and 
within those groups, sub-groups and individuals who possess vastly different levels and 
types of access to social resources. A context dependant approach to social capital frames the 
concept not as the presence of certain norms, as is the case with Putnam, but rather as those 
structures which allow access to social resources, differing networks of which voluntary 
organisations are a part, but only a part, of what is a more holistic view, and a more useful 
concept. Coleman's conception has a much wider potential. In one of his earlier works 
exploring the subject, Coleman looked at social capital in the context of high school 
dropouts and discussed it in terms of its effect on education.43   
Coleman emphasises the importance of social networks as providers of social resources. 
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Putnam also included networks as one of the key components of social capital, but in his 
reading they were tied to the norms that it was their role to promote. The difference between 
the two is that while norms can be culturally specific, the presence of social networks is 
readily observable and objective.44 Separating form and function in this way allows for a 
less biased view of social capital in a given society. It allows one to observe social networks 
and look at the norms that they are actually promoting. It thus liberates itself from 
necessarily seeing voluntary associationalism as the path to the norms of trust and 
reciprocity. This will become very important in the fourth chapter, when looking at Pacific 
thought, and the norms and values inherent the fa'asamoa system.  
The social/structural approach to social capital employed by Coleman allows a context 
dependant analysis within different social structures. This differs to Putnam's approach 
because of an apparent cultural bias in his conception of social capital and especially his 
emphasis on the importance of civic associationalism in the creation of social capital. The 
realisation of context dependency makes social capital a more useful concept within western 
societies, but also outside of western societies. While it may be possible to better understand 
the acquisition and use of social capital within particular groups, trades, or organisations, it 
is also more possible to explore the role of social capital in other cultural contexts. 
Both Coleman and Putnam are liberal theorists, and the differences between their two 
conceptions are not as radical as the differences between the various ideas relating to civil 
society presented above. However it is important to note these differences as it is Putnam's 
theory that has generated the most excitement which has in turn advised the governance 
strategies of international donors. Though in reality it seems to be the most historically and 
culturally biased of the two.  
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2.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has sought to explain why a theoretical link exists between the idea of civil 
society and the idea of good governance, namely greater democratisation. In doing so, it has 
identified two broad camps that exist in the theoretical literature in describing this 
apparently positive relationship. Civil society has both real and practical effects on 
democratic institutions within countries, and deeper effects as documented in the second part 
of the chapter. Civil society can be seen as a 'training ground' in which people engage in 
associational life and learn the values of trust and reciprocity. This in turn makes them good 
citizens, ready to act in the interests of the community and ready to engage in the democratic 
life of the community without recourse to violence or other extreme acts in order to secure 
their interests. They will be respectful of points of view that differ from their own and will 
be willing to compromise in true democratic spirit.  
It has also identified this particular view of civil society and social capital, and the way they 
relate to governance, as but one among a number of theoretical traditions relating to both 
concepts. They are contested terms, yet the particular reading that has most influenced the 
recent rise to prominence of civil society as a panacea for governance ills around the world 
is grounded in Western liberal theory, and based on Western historical experience. Civil 
society has had a long history and the definitions posited at the beginning of the chapter 
demonstrate that the majority of current thought focuses on a liberal 'neo-Tocquevillian' 
conception. Michael Edwards reminds us that there are other theoretical strands, including 
the idea of the 'good society', or 'society which is civil', as well as a distinctly Marxist 
conception. Finally, looking in to differing ideas about the concept of social capital reveals 
some weaknesses in Putnam's definition. The prospect of exploring social capital in differing 
cultural contexts becomes more possible by realising that form and function can be separate. 
If social capital is seen as less a combined aggregate of networks and norms, and more as 
the presence of social networks through which individuals gain social resources, the focus 
can be put on what kind of norms are being created, and the kinds of collective action it can 
induce. This makes it possible to conceive of forms of civil society and social capital that 
could enhance governance, but which do not meet the voluntary associative ideal inherent in 
liberal thought. 
 The next chapter will explore some of the main criticisms that have been made regarding 
the good governance 'agenda' for civil society in its application in developing countries. 
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Chapter Three: Civil Society and the Good Governance 
Agenda in the Developing World 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The preceding chapter has looked in some detail at civil society and social capital in the way 
that they relate to democratisation, or better governance. The intent of the last part was to 
muddy the waters around the underpinning liberal theory behind civil society's role in the 
good governance agenda and to make clear that the liberal 'neo-tocquevillian' conception, 
namely, Robert Putnam's assumptions about the creation and role of social capital, and his 
particular conception of civil society, are but one among a number of theories about the role 
of civil society, and the use of the concept of social capital.  
The liberal conception of civil society's role as a promoter of democracy is full of 
assumptions. They have to do with civil society's role vis-a-vis the state and the private 
sector, the inherent potential of civil society to provide an effective balance on the state, the 
potential of civil society to act as a learning ground for the norms associated with social 
capital, and democracy’s reliance on these norms as a cultural precondition. 
As has already been claimed, those assumptions have been translated, since the 1990's, to 
the governing policies of international development donors. These donors, be they 
International Financial Institutions (IFI's) such as the World Bank or the International 
Monetary Fund, bilateral government donors such as the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), the United Kingdom's Department for International 
Development (DFID) or the New Zealand Agency for International Development (NZAID) 
or even International Non-governmental Organisations (INGO's) like Oxfam, have to 
differing degrees jumped on the civil society 'bandwagon'. This chapter will look into these 
donor's activities in the realm of civil society promotion and seek to critically assess the 
impacts in developing countries.  
It has already been alluded to in previous chapters that a key problem with the civil society 
agenda is that it represents a transferral of Western political experience to other parts of the 
world. These other parts of the world may be areas where such ideas or institutions might be 
meaningless or at worst, destabilising. Proponents of Putnam's views have been labelled by 
critics as 'neo-Tocquvillians', and their findings are said to be based on such a specific time, 
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and in such a specific space (i.e. the United States in the early 19th Century) that the 
transferral of these values and practices to, say, today's Sub-Saharan Africa is so difficult 
that some have labelled it as ultimately pointless. This stands in direct contrast to liberal 
assertions about the universality of civil society and its positive effects on social capital and 
governance. The second part of this chapter will look at ways in which the civil society 
agenda could be viewed. 
The first part of this chapter, however, will focus on some of the key studies that back up the 
idea that the governance agenda for civil society is ultimately flawed. That 'neo-
Tocquevillian' thought makes little sense in the context of developing countries, and areas 
where in practice, the actions of donors and NGO's have perhaps caused more harm than 
good.  
It is necessary, at the beginning, to defend the view that international development donors 
do, in fact, subscribe to the 'neo-Tocquevillian' liberal view, identified in the preceding 
chapter. In other words, do international donors see the funding of civil society organisations 
as an end in itself while trying to achieve good governance objectives. Do they subscribe to 
the view that CSO's perform important functions in and of themselves in providing a check 
on the state's excesses and articulating political demands, but also act as important 
wellsprings of social capital by embodying and teaching the norms of trust and reciprocity 
that are apparently so important to the success of democracy? 
Peter Davis and J. McGregor, writing about civil society funding in Bangladesh, note that 
civil society's positive role in terms of transition to and consolidation of democracy that 
donors often espouse, draws heavily on the works of mainstream liberal political scientists 
from America, including Seymour Martin Lipset, Larry Diamond, and Juan Linz.45 Also, 
“Robert Putnam's interpretation of Social Capital, seen as a variable underpinning effective 
democratic governance, is also usually prominent in donor documentation.”46 
The presence of “Putnamesque” or neo-Tocquevillian thought behind donor activities is 
explicitly espoused by the World Bank. In its section on civil society, the World Bank's 
website states: “CSOs can play an important role in helping to amplify the voices of the 
poorest people in the decisions that affect their lives, improve development effectiveness 
and sustainability, and hold governments and policymakers publicly accountable.”47 This 
represents the bank's alignment with the liberal view of civil society as an 'antidote' to the 
state, as well as being a forum for the aggregation and articulation of demands. Elsewhere in 
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the website, it is stated that: “The World Bank has learned through these three decades of 
interaction that the participation of CSOs in government development projects and programs 
can enhance their operational performance by contributing local knowledge, providing 
technical expertise, and leveraging social capital.”48 Although it is a harder point to put 
across in the context of a website that is trying to be brief, it still makes the point that 
“leveraging social capital” is one of the key roles for civil society, and the key reasons that it 
forms such a big part of the Bank's governance programme. These examples are used to 
demonstrate that it is by no means controversial to claim that key development donors, in 
the inclusion of civil society strengthening in their governance programmes, draw on 
particular liberal Western theories in their guiding principles. In particular, the liberal view 
of civil society and its importance to democratic governance that arose (mainly) in the 
1990's, has been key to formulating the policies of these organisations. 
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3.2 Civil Society in the Developing World 
 
 
This liberal conception of civil society and social capital places emphasis on the role of civil 
society as a “third sector” alongside the state and the market. In classic liberal and neo-
liberal thought, while the market supplies and distributes goods and services, and the state 
upholds the law, e.g. to protect private property and the sanctity of contracts, civil society 
provides, largely, everything else. It is the associational realm in which ideas are contested 
and it is largely informal. It is the key to providing some of the basic tenets of democracy as 
has been discussed earlier.  
In development, it is often necessary for the separate functions of this 'triadic' arrangement 
to work together. In the good governance agenda, it is often the case that state institutions 
and civil society must come together for the same goals. Most of the large international 
donor organisations are state institutions, such as USAID, DFID, and NZAID. In their 
funding of civil society organisations, there are key structural and operational aims they 
must meet. Within state institutions, particularly those attached to western governments, 
accountability is a key requirement, both in financial terms and in operational terms. If 
USAID financially backs a project, that project must keep account of all its expenditure, 
while at the same time justifying that expenditure by providing a discernable result.  
This has a number of effects. First of all, it affects the type of organisations that donors tend 
to fund or provide assistance to. They must be able to provide account of their activities in a 
way that is readily recognisable to their politically accountable donors. This greatly limits 
the amount of 'CSO's' that receive funding. In particular, international NGO's and local 
NGO's that are already organised around Western accounting practises and democratic 
norms, in short, organisations that 'resemble' the donors that fund them. 
While it can be claimed that liberal thought in general is culturally specific, so it can with 
the way in which this ideology views the role of civil society. In fact, civil society has 
elsewhere been described as a metaphor for Western liberalism.49 This may miss critical 
aspects of social life in those developing countries that do not share the same historical 
experience as those in the west. Many groups, for instance, find themselves excluded from 
donor’s definitions of what civil society is. Non-voluntary groups based on ties that are not 
simply associational, for instance (such as tribal groups), may contribute to a large degree to 
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social cohesiveness (or even social capital) will find themselves left out. 
The next two sections will look at first, arguments that point out that funding civil society 
may not be the best way to ensure satisfactory political change, particularly in reference to 
it's comparison to institutions of the state and other democratic institutions, and reasons why 
it may have a negative aggregate result. The second section will look at NGO's as the main 
conduit for civil society funding in the developing world and some of the negative 
externalities associated with that. 
 
3.2.1 Civil Society, Democratic Institutions and the State 
 
Much is made of the question of whether it is civil society, or existing democratic 
institutions that are the most important variable for the success of a healthy functioning 
democracy. Much is also made of the effect that an inflated focus on civil society could have 
on other institutions, for instance the state in its service delivery role.  
Recently, Omar G. Encarnacion published a book attacking the good governance agenda for 
civil society. The thrust of his attack was based on a comparative study he undertook, 
looking at the democratic transitions of Spain and Brazil. His claim was that one of those 
countries (Spain) achieved a very satisfactory and sustainable political transition despite the 
very low level of civil society organisations and associational density found in that country. 
Comparatively, Brazil, which according to Encarnacion has much higher levels of civic 
associationalism, has failed to institute a successful democratic culture, and its political life 
is still often mired by corruption and anti-democratic practices. The lesson he drew form this 
was that first and foremost, “democratic consolidation depends for its success upon efficient 
and stable political institutions rather than vibrant and robust civil societies” and also, that 
“we have... misunderstood what matters most about civil society in connection to the 
process of democratic consolidation... we are better served by shifting our analytical lenses 
towards the performance of the political system”.50 This last point referred to the fact that 
while much analysis focused on the measurement of associational density and other 
indicators that would demonstrate a strength in civil society, less analysis focuses on the 
actual outcome, in governance terms, of those processes. What this means is that we may 
have lost site of the goal while becoming enamoured with a particular ideological strain of 
thought.  
Encarnacion has been criticized for not going into as much detail as he perhaps should as far 
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as his claim that we should focus more on 'supporting democratic institutions'. However, he 
does claim that donor support of particular areas where executive power is most apparent, 
and key features of democracies, such as the electoral process, during democratic transitions 
and beyond, would do much more to ensure public support for and trust in the political 
actors and institutions which goes a long way towards building 'social capital'. 
The civil society agenda has also been contrasted against the role of the state. There has 
been a suggestion that the strengthening of civil society may not just be less effective than 
supporting political institutions, but rather it is harmful to the state itself, and thus it serves a 
politically destabilising role, perhaps endangering political transitions or the capability of 
the state to function in the way that it should. 
There is certainly a common belief among some observers that the dynamic between CSO's, 
especially NGO's and the state may actually be damaging to the state. This is of particular 
importance to newly emerging democracies, as it deals with the issue of legitimacy. As 
NGO's go about the business of development assistance, many of the key state service 
delivery areas are co-opted. This harms state legitimacy, as people become more 
stakeholders in NGO activity, than they do of the State. Bangladesh, in particular, has been 
described as a “franchise state”.51 International NGO's are accountable to outside donors and 
are therefore not affected by political change within the affected country. Also, as people 
become disengaged with affairs of the state they become less likely to engage in political 
processes. 
In this vein, another body of work links the civil society agenda with the neo-liberal project, 
or at least claims that it strengthens the “antistate bias”52 of the neo-liberal agenda. Despite 
many differing political or cultural contexts, donors still see civil society as essentially 
fulfilling a role in which it attacks the state, or defends society against it. The growth of the 
governance agenda, according to this point of view, grew as a response to the failure of the 
economic liberalisation strategies of the 1980's known as the Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAP's). If this basic economic policy did not work, it could only be the fault of 
corrupt and inefficient governments. Lack of internal interest in reforms could be overcome 
by essentially going over the heads of governments and funding alternative service providers 
and groups which could hold the state accountable.53 It was also cheaper than attempting to 
achieve large scale reform, as Thomas Carothers writes: “Funding citizen activism seemed 
to hold out the promise of a low-cost way to achieve large-scale effects. Thus civil society 
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programmes grew as aid budgets shrank”.54 At the very least, international donors do not 
engage in funding aspects of civil society that challenges the “status quo of on-going neo-
liberal reform”.55 
It has also been noted, that the funding of civil society represents an overall cost cutting 
measure. Funding expensive changes to government institutions compared unfavourably to 
simply putting smaller amounts of money into the hands of CSO's. Armed with the requisite 
theory, it could be argued that this would aid the consolidation of democratic practice in the 
long run. This is especially true of USAID, the largest spender when it comes to CSO's.56 
Civil society funding, for the purposes ascribed to it by international donors, may not be the 
best path to good governance. As Omar Encarnacion's work points out, the empirical 
evidence for favouring civil society over the strengthening democratic institutions is a little 
thin, and he provides a clear counter-example. It also could be the case that emphasis on 
civil society has the potentially destabilising effect of weakening state infrastructure and 
legitimacy. 
 
 
3.2.2 NGO's: a Blessing or a Curse? 
 
 
In the context of the developing world, especially in parts of the world that are seen by 
donors to have a very weak indigenous civil society, the key agents of democratic change 
have become Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO's), many of which do not originate in 
the country in question, but rather in the developed world. NGO's have increasingly become 
the focal point for good governance funding.57 It should be pointed out that NGO's are 
usually distinguished from Grass Roots Organisations (GRO's) which are usually single 
issue based and non-professional. NGO's are identified by the fact that they are often “large 
and well resourced”, have professional staff which are often “urban professionals or 
expatriates” and receive high levels of funding (often international).58  
NGO's have been thus favoured by multilateral and bilateral donors for a myriad of reasons. 
Firstly, they more immediately resemble the type of civil society found in the West. Civil 
Society in the developing world in which grassroots democracy has not yet taken hold, 
including tribal and ethnic groups, fledgling grassroots movements and the like, often fail to 
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meet donor's criteria. This dynamic is especially apparent when the NGO in question has 
originated itself in the Western world. It is also true that many NGO's have proved 
themselves in terms of their engagement with poor communities, and are thus very attractive 
as nodes of development funding. This section will look into some of the observed negative 
externalities that arise from NGO's favoured position in terms of civil society funding. 
Returning to the point made in the preceding section about the behaviour of donors in 
funding organisations that resemble them in terms of things like accounting practices (which 
often favour large well resourced NGO's), observations have also been made about the 
concentration of donor funding at the doors of NGO's, particularly of the international 
variety. For instance, Alison Van Rooy notes that in Kenya, the major funding institutions 
(USAID, The Ford Foundation, NORAD) provide the bulk of their funding to organisations 
like the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC), the Research and Civic Awareness 
Programme (RECAP), and the International Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA).59 Van 
Rooy puts this down to a number of reasons. The mandates that these organisations hold 
(e.g. law and human rights) are central to the mandates of the funding organisations as well. 
This outsourcing of work, which could be the result of a process of self-selection may result 
in donors backing up what they see as important in their own country rather than what might 
be most urgent or appropriate in the country where the organisation is based. Van Rooy also 
claims that the reputation of the organisation or its leader is also a key determinate in 
selecting organisations. This could lead to relatively unknown organisations or groups to not 
even register on a donor's shortlist.60 
The good governance agenda adds to this phenomenon. While, theoretically, it is the 
associational values that have encouraged the switch to civil society funding, organisations 
are often chosen based on the particular values they espouse. Davis and McGregor state that 
“one of the issues arising from the influence of the liberal political science discourse on the 
international donor establishment is its particular normative approach to civil society. 
Particular types of organisation are seen as qualifying on the basis of their democracy-
promoting characteristics and organisations deemed as antagonistic or counterproductive in 
the project of democratisation are excluded.”61 This, in a developing world setting, precludes 
a huge number of groups and movements. Groups that are both well organised and focus 
their attention specifically on democratic or democracy enhancing activities tend to be 
NGO's, even INGO's from the developed world. 
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NGO's and in particular the relationship between NGO's and large donor organisations raise 
many observed problems. A study in Kenya found that there were a number of problems 
regarding how people interact with NGO's and NGO's with other bodies. For instance, many 
donor staff have admitted that a certain amount of favouritism does occur in terms of 
funding, admitting that things like the reputation of an organisation's leader or of an 
organisation itself greatly influences funding behaviour. In one case, a single organisation 
was receiving a quarter of a donor's total funding over two years.62 In Central Asia, donors 
tend to favour organisations with professional staff that “command English and Russian and 
are at ease with Western Europeans and North Americans”.63 
It is also a common complaint that donors, in selecting organisations to fund, focus too 
much on professional and urban based organisations, exhibiting a bias which may well 
exacerbate many of the inequalities already established in developing countries. Urban 
based populations tend to already experience greater political representation as well as other 
benefits that well funded CSO's bring. In many cases it may also add to perceived regional, 
social or ethnic bias. In Kenya, the bias towards Nairobi-based professional organisations 
excludes many popular forms of civil society, such as rural economic groups and community 
based organisations.64 
Favouritism and self selection by donors also leads to another observed difficulty, that of 
donor co-option of NGO's and other CSO's. While donors use particular criteria to select 
organisations to fund, the organisations, in turn, transform themselves to fit in with those 
criteria. While this may be seen as positive (i.e. more organisations with transparent 
accounting practises), it is questionable as to whether this does much to actually bolster civil 
society in the region in question. It has been observed, for instance, in Central Asia, that new 
CSO's and existing local NGO's respond “more to the priorities and interests of donor 
agencies rather than defining their own institutional identity.”65 This detracts from the 
locally driven agenda that these organisations have the potential to address, instead, in order 
to receive a greater share of funding, CSO's end up representing “a patchwork of tenuously 
related projects such as microcredit, women's empowerment, and environment” or whatever 
happens to be the most fashionable cause among donor agencies, rather than causes or 
movements which reflect local realities and therefore have the most transformative potential. 
Not only does this process end up underestimating the extent of local civil society, it also 
runs the risk of undermining those local practises. Older forms of mass organisation, 
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including “trade unions, memberships groups such as farmer's organisations... receive 
relatively little donor support”.66 
Bangladesh presents an interesting case study, in that country many of the problems relating 
to NGO's being the major node of donor funding for civil society become apparent. This is 
especially apparent when looking at the negative effect this has on Bangladesh's indigenous 
civil society. A chief reason for this is an inadequacy in the liberal conception of civil 
society, in that it cannot accurately predict the relationship between civil society actors and 
political actors in Bangladeshi society. Civil society in Bangladesh is very tied to the 
political life of the country and no separation between the political and civic spheres is 
assumed. Thus, within Bangladeshi culture, the role if NGO's, being apolitical and 
accountable to foreigners seems to be “alien and anachronistic”.67 Much of the support 
NGO's get from donors is hampered by the fact that their activities are limited by their very 
organisational structure. They arouse the suspicion of elites, radicals feel they are too willing 
to work with hegemonic actors, conservatives distrust their apparent progressivenenss, 
political parties distrust them because they won't entrust their loyalty. Despite the fact they 
don't really fit in with their donor-backed agenda, NGO's are crowding out the civil society 
sector, allegedly to the detriment of genuine grassroots activism.68  
Kendall Stiles maps out the ways in which NGO's have managed to create an entirely new 
segment of society, based around a professional class, which is centred around themselves, 
while at the same time alienating themselves from the rest of society. Donors emphasised the 
importance of 'sustainability' in the work of NGO's, and without strong links to other 
organisations or the private sector, NGO's set about trying to raise funds themselves. This 
caused resistance from the business community, a particularly damaging fact in that strong 
links with the business community is very important to the donor-based agenda. Particularly 
seeing as an eventual cordial relationship between these two aspects of society is the final 
goal, the role that NGO's have played in this regard risk poisoning the relationship right 
from the start.69  
While NGO's pursue many progressive policies, in some ways their failure to address the 
more standard issues that face other aspects of civil society has caused problems. For 
instance, while they work very hard for women's rights in a number of areas including the 
workforce, they seem hesitant to join with the labour unions in advocating for traditional 
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male factory workers. This causes distrust between labour unions and NGO's.70 This kind of 
activity also alienates conservative groups, particularly conservative Islamist groups (of 
which there are a great many). While NGO's have the potential to “serve as the social glue to 
bind these [many and varied] actors togather”71, they tend to antagonise and alienate 
themselves from these organisations and movements. 
The structure of the relationship between NGO's and donors adds to the separation between 
NGO's and the communities they serve. While projects are often delegated out to NGO's 
from the developed world, these NGO's also delegate to local NGO's, for their perceived 
'closeness' to the community in question.72 An observation has been made that, in Ghana at 
least, many of these local NGO's use their position of power and trust to maintain their 
status as 'wardens' of a particular constituency of villages. Assumedly, this is for 
organisational ends rather than for project-related ends. Sometimes, these organisations can 
exhibit patronising attitudes towards the local villages they claim to represent, but know 
they are “beyond reproach”.73  
The emphasis on funding NGO's is the result of the theoretical genesis behind the good 
governance agenda for civil society. They encapsulate what is meant by civil society in the 
eyes of international donors. Unfortunately, while they do a lot that is good in their 
development related activities, their existence introduces a number of negative externalities 
that hamper their effectiveness in the realm of good governance, and in some cases make 
their actions harmful rather than positive or even neutral. It is obvious why donors have 
given NGO's pride of place in terms of good governance funding, in looking for appropriate 
civil society ‘qualities’, many parts of the developing world were found wanting. This 
section has highlighted some of the reasons why funding the expansion of such a separate 
NGO “class” may not be such a good idea in terms of the wider goals of strengthening civil 
society, and its transformative potential in society. 
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3.3 Adaptive Prescription 
 
Though the main body of this chapter has put forward a critical view of civil society funding 
in the developing world, arguing for the most part that it is an erroneous aim to transfer the 
lessons of Western political development to areas like Sub-Saharan Africa or South Asia, it 
is not necessary to conclude that the idea of civil society has absolutely no merit in these 
parts of the world at all. The idea is rather that the particular liberal conception of civil 
society discussed in the first chapter which is used to justify the actions of bilateral and 
multilateral donors (and which leads to an NGO bias in funding patterns) lacks the potential 
to fully grasp the entire civil society picture in the developing world.  
In many parts of the developing world, for instance, civil society has had a long history. 
Latin America is a prime example of this. Some historians have traced the current pro-
democracy groups which are very prevalent in Latin America to anti-colonial movements in 
the early nineteenth century.74 In Sub-Saharan Africa, the colonial period also saw a growth 
in civil society, albeit limited. Much of this was racially segregated, for instance white 
farmers oversaw the creation of interest groups based around their industry. Social 
movements also grew up in opposition to colonialism. As Jude Howell and Jenny Pierce 
state: “In the absence of oppositional political parties resistance to colonial rule developed 
on an intricate web of formal and non-formal institutions.”75 These included labour unions, 
professional associations and independent churches and schools, but also resistance emerged 
through ethnic and tribal lines. The Mau-Mau struggle in Kenya is an example of this, but 
also community based institutions such as burial societies played a huge part in the struggle 
against colonialism. 
This picture adds up to what might be called 'indigenous civil society'. These groups, 
traditions and movements better reflect the kinds of issues and protocol that are important to 
people on the ground. In this way they are different from the kinds of NGO's that often 
receive the lion's share of donor funding, and are tied to outside agendas.  
The liberal conception of civil society ignores key facts about many parts of the developing 
world. This includes the historical legacy of colonialism, and also organisations which bear 
little resemblance to western civil society organisations. Such organisations may centre on 
kin, ethnicity or local traditions, and thus do not live up to the associational ideal prevalent 
in the civil society literature. At the same time, it is probably a mistake to claim that the idea 
of civil society has no relevance at all. As has been seen, there are many various forms of 
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indigenous civil society scattered throughout the world that may not meet a western liberal 
ideal, but are still important nonetheless.  
David Lewis, while mapping out differing approaches to the problem of civil society in the 
developing world, puts forward the idea of “adaptive prescription”. After discussing the 
problems associated with the “Prescriptive Universalism” (an optimistic liberal conception) 
and “Western Exceptionalism” (The idea that civil society has no meaning outside its 
Western origin) points of view, he finds the Adaptive Prescription approach to be a third way 
option. Regarding the key tenets of the approach, Lewis finds various examples of 
conciliatory thinking. Included in this is Maina's study of civil society in Kenya, and his 
conclusion that the view of civil society needs to be expanded to include institutions that 
make more sense within that country's cultural context. In particular, there needs to be a 
movement away from a “'Western preoccupation with rights and advocacy to include self 
help groups that are organised for personal, economic ends”76, specifically referring to rural 
farmers co-operatives and other forms of mutual economic assistance. This civil society 
activity, while not inherently based upon holding the state to account or providing a training 
ground for democratic behaviour, focuses on a “mistrust of state and overcoming civic 
apathy” and it is a realm where independent political leadership may emerge.77 
It is unnecessary to limit civil society to a “narrowly defined institutional arena”.78  Why 
couldn't clan based or kinship groups, while protecting their interests, not hold the 
government to account in certain important ways? It becomes very difficult to generalise 
about what could institute civil society in differing cultural contexts, as Michael Edwards 
states: “many membership associations are not very civil, while many non-membership 
bodies play a central civic role”. Also, “certain things may be desirable in a “good” civil 
society organisation (like independence from government or corporate finance, or clear 
downward accountability procedures), but they are expressed differently according to 
culture and context”.79  It is important, Edwards argues, to see civil society as a contested 
domain, incorporating aspects of the market and government, not one which works towards 
the same end and is defined by its separation from other aspects of society.  
Edwards also points out the importance of a more contextual understanding of civil society 
in terms of social capital creation. Preferring to label it 'social energy' to take away its more 
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economic connotations, he claims that community groups and other civil society institutions 
are important nodes of this, although it must be understood that civil society alone cannot 
(many CSO's are exclusionary and many foster undemocratic practices) what is important is 
what each institution does, not what it is.80  
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3.4 Conclusion 
 
 
This chapter has approached the critical analyses of the good governance agenda for civil 
society in the developing world, particularly its most visible area, NGO's. It has looked at 
some of the key arguments against the current enthusiasm for civil society as a theoretical 
cure-all for observed governance problems. It has potentially destabilising effects on already 
strained states, and the way it has been implemented has led to many unfortunate 
externalities. The way civil society funding has been approached, and the theoretical 
grounding for this approach, are both part of the same problem. The liberal bias in the 
literature which has been adopted by international donors does not account for the kind of 
indigenous forms of civil society that make the most sense in a local context. With the idea 
of 'adaptive prescription' framing it, this chapter has looked at some of the negative 
externalities of civil society funding (which in most cases translates to the funding of 
NGO's) and the way in which this creates a 'separate class' of NGO's often urban based, 
competing for donor money, but which may in fact be diverting attention from genuine 
grassroots movements and indigenous forms of civil society. It has argued for the need to 
expand our horizons regarding civil society to take in institutions and organisations that 
while they do not fit in with a strict reading of liberal theory, could be regarded as useful in 
effecting change in the developing world. 
The next chapter will focus singularly on Samoa as a case study. It is a developing nation 
where the 'good governance' agenda is alive and well, promoted by bilateral donors and 
international NGO's. The main focus in the chapter, however, will be the key institution of 
indigenous civil society, known as the fa'asamoa or “Samoan way”. It is the most important 
provider of social capital, and arena for the political life of Samoan communities. 
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Chapter Four: The Fa'asamoa and Traditional Samoan 
Civil Society 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 
The good governance agenda in the Pacific has led to support for 'civil society' narrowly 
conceived of in terms of its European and American origins. This chapter will dig deeper 
into the critical arguments around the defining of civil society by describing indigenous 
social practices and institutions of traditional governance. It will return, in the most part, to 
the key aspect of civil society, that of social capital creation, and discuss the issue of social 
capital, particularly identified forms of social capital that arise out of traditional practice. It 
will focus on Samoa as an example although many of the kinds of beliefs and social 
structures explained also exist in other parts of the South Pacific.  
When discussing these traditional social structures as a stand in for civil society, it is worth 
remembering that civil society is a contested topic, as discussed in chapter two. In many 
ways, in as much as an institution such as the fa'asamoa is an important source of social 
capital as will be argued below, it also instils values that many authors associate with the 
'good society' identified by Michael Edwards as one of the theoretical nodes from which the 
idea of civil society has come about.  
The last part of the chapter will also look into some pertinent aspects of Pacific thought to 
provide the institution of the fa'asamoa with more colour. It is important to look at these 
normative aspects in order to gain a better understanding of the institution. 
 
 
 43 
4.2 Samoa, the Pacific and Governance Aid 
 
 
Samoa is a largely agrarian society, with just under 200,000 people. The majority of the 
population engage in subsistence farming. There are two main islands, Upolu and Savai'i. 
The total land area is just less than 3,000 square kilometres. Apia (on Upolu) is the capital 
and the biggest urban centre, but most people live in the villages. Samoa gained it's 
independence in 1962 from New Zealand. It had also previously been a German colony.  
From 2005 data, Samoa ranked 77th on the Human Development Index,81 ahead of other 
South Pacific nations (Fiji was 92nd). Politically, Samoa also performs better in various 
indices. Freedom House rates Samoa as a 'free' country,82 although it came 57th out of 180 in 
Transparency International's 2007 Corruption Perceptions Index.83 International aid, along 
with remittances, is a big part of the Samoan economy, and the governance agenda is alive 
and well in Samoa. 
In the South Pacific, the major bilateral aid donors are the governments of New Zealand and 
Australia. The respective aid agencies of these countries, the New Zealand Agency for 
International Development (NZAID) and the Australian Agency for International 
Development (AusAID) both subscribe to the good governance agenda for civil society. For 
both agencies, building civil society is one of the key tenets of their governance 
programmes. The Australian assistance for improved governance policy framework includes 
“developing civil society”84 as one of its five key areas, and NZAID's Pacific Programme for 
Strengthening Governance (PPSG) has as some of its current core objectives to: “strengthen 
organisational capacity of civil society organisations at local, national and regional levels ...” 
and to “improve the enabling environment for civil society in Pacific countries ...”.85 
During the rise of the governance agenda, the number of NGO's in the Pacific, as well as the 
number of outside NGO's working in the Pacific has risen quickly. There is now an umbrella 
organisation known as the Pacific Islands Association of Non Governmental Organisations 
(PIANGO). Formed in 1991, PIANGO works to facilitate a collective voice on issues, and 
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help facilitate networking and shared learning among NGO's.86 Both NZAID and AUSAID 
fund PIANGO reasonably heavily, recently, a joint press statement confirmed that 
collectively they were granting PIANGO a combined total of FJD $4.87m to fund its 
activities over the next three years.87 Within Samoa, there is also the Samoan Umbrella of 
Non-Governmental Organisations (SUNGO). As of 2007, there were 98 NGO's on 
SUNGO's membership list.88 
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4.3 The Fa'asamoa 
 
Traditional institutions such as the fa'asamoa can be seen as civil society. Although it stands 
in apparent paradox to the liberal Western conception of what civil society is, in terms of its 
bias towards voluntary associational organisations (a bias which arises out of western 
political experience and development), institutions such as the fa'asamoa can be seen to 
instil essential values which are ascribed only to voluntary associational organisations in the 
literature which follows the western liberal tradition. This section will give an overview of 
the fa'asamoa as a concept, followed in the next section by an exploration of its value as a 
part of civil society and as a node of social capital. The aim is to explore an institution that a 
strict reading of western literature would ignore in terms of its value as a part of civil 
society, yet which as will be shown, may have a positive impact on many areas attributed to 
civil society and on the stock of social capital which may be drawn upon.  
The fa'asamoa literally means “The Samoan Way”. It could variably indicate Samoan 
custom, tradition, or culture.   “The fa'asamoa is literally the Samoan way of doing things 
and refers to traditional practices, customary behaviour and mutual assistance in the village 
context and beyond. The fa'asamoa is a both a social structure, organising the shape of the 
community, and a set of cultural processes and protocols that determine the pattern of village 
activity”.89 
The difficulty of translating the term directly in to English is made apparent when it is used 
as a noun, and adjective and a verb all at once. It is in essence an umbrella term for a lot of 
concepts, and many of the major aspects of the fa'asamoa can be extracted and discussed. In 
general, as quoted above, it is both the description of a social structure, and an ascriptive set 
of protocols.  
Focusing first on the latter, the fa'asamoa ascribes patterns of behaviour to members of the 
nu'u (village) which is the primary focal point of Samoan society. Embedded in the term are 
many concepts, such as respect for elders and particular obligations to family, community 
and church, which are expected to be adhered to.  
It has been remarked upon that the strength with which the fa'asamoa pervades day to day 
life varies in different parts of Samoa. In the urban centres such as Apia, people have in 
general adapted to a more westernised and urbanised lifestyle. Although aspects of the 
fa'asamoa remain, the obligations attached to it are less apparent than they are in the rural 
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areas where traditional behaviours, obligations and social sanctions remain strong. It can be 
said that the fa'asamoa in rural areas is “more like the fa'asamoa of days gone by”.90  
An important aspect of the fa'asamoa is the idea of respect (fa'aaloalo). Everyone has an 
obligation to provide utmost respect to their peers, but especially their elders and superiors. 
The term fa'aalaolo specifically refers to “listening to the dictates and, in response, rendering 
them humble service”.91 
Within the fa'asamoa, obligations such as this are enforced in various ways. Sometimes, 
physical punishment can be used in order to maintain discipline. It is important to note that 
obligations and punishment also apply to the Matai, or head of a family. The actions of the 
Matai are ruled by the fono, or village council. If they step too far out of line, then even 
Matai can expect punishment. In fact, punishments are more comprehensive to wayward 
Matai. Sometimes it can go to extremes such as in September 1993 in the village of Lona, 
when Nu'utai Mafulu was executed after refusing to “abide by certain protocols and 
regulations of his village” and he “refused to contribute to village affairs, [and] resisted 
council decision...”.92 
Obviously, this sort of thing is quite extreme and is liable only to happen in the more remote 
rural areas, but it does demonstrate the power of local tradition over people’s lives, 
particularly in these areas. It demonstrates the high importance that people ascribe to 
traditional obligations and respect for those obligations, whether it is the general respect that 
members of the village are supposed to exhibit, or the service, and respect for village 
institutions that the village leaders are supposed to demonstrate. 
There are other social rituals and protocols that form a big part of Samoan lives, and an 
important part of the fa'asamoa. These traditions, while serving specific purposes also add to 
the 'social glue' which connects people within the village. For instance, the evening prayer 
curfew, a short time in the early evening (signalled by a bell or conch shell) when people do 
not move in or out of the village, or the various protocols while inside fale (houses) are 
examples of this. 
As stated above, the fa'asamoa is also descriptive, in that it is a name given to a certain set of 
social practices which govern village life in Samoa, and also have ramifications for national 
governance. This governance system, based on the person of the Matai is also known as 
fa'amatai. Within it, social roles are well defined, although internal democratic principles 
like that described below still prevail.  The Nu'u, being the focal point of Samoan society, is 
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also the focal point of governance and authority. The Nu'u is made up of Aiga, or extended 
family groups, which are typically large compared to western nuclear families. Each family 
has a leader, or Matai. The Matai have an authoritative position in the village, and ultimately 
most authority is given to the council (or fono) of village Matai. Other institutions exist, 
such as the 'womans council' (Faletua ma Tausi), and the council of untitled men (Aumaga) 
which all have church and village responsibilities. The concept of Matai is slightly different 
from a more simplified understanding of a chief. Although they must have the 'requisite 
genealogy' to be the leader of their family, there are other aspects taken into consideration. A 
Matai must have demonstrated leadership and wisdom, and must have served both their 
families and the village in some way. A Matai is not simply the most senior male member of 
a particular family line. There are two types of Matai. The Ali'i or 'sitting chiefs', and the 
Tulafale (talking chiefs or orators) who among other things are the voice of their Ali'i at 
ceremonial occasions. The title Matai is not necessarily the description of a person, a Matai 
is neither male of female. It is a separate entity. A Matai is an “heir who has been elected to 
the matai title of an aiga by all heirs of the matai tile.”93 
Although the fa'asamoa denotes certain practises and titles, it is important to remember that 
it is anything but an unchanging entity. Rather, the fa'asamoa could be seen as something 
that is always changing and adapting to new ideas and situations. The most obvious example 
of this found in history is the adaption to Christian beliefs and value systems that 
accompanied the work of the missionaries in the nineteenth century. Samoa is now a 
strongly Christian society, and while the fa'asamoa resembles what came before, it is very 
different. Malama Meleisea wrote that the introduction of Christianity had a 'levelling effect' 
on the power structure within the fa'asamoa by “removing the justification for attributing 
great powers to a few great chiefs... Without the ideological justification of bloodlines which 
linked men and women to gods, the criteria of succession became more complicated in 
relation to the highest ranking titles”.94  Therefore it redefined chiefly power as secular, thus 
allowing more people to obtain high ranks. This point is an important one to keep in mind 
when discussing how the fa'asamoa might relate to civil society or good governance aims. 
Like other social systems it has the capacity to change and redefine itself in light of new 
pressures while still maintaining its core character and principles. 
Different aspects of the fa'asamoa system, including some of the normative tenets that the 
system is based on will be discussed below. The next part of this chapter will look at the 
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ways in which the fa'asamoa can be seen as a part of civil society, and a key provider of 
social capital, in order to support the argument that it should not be overlooked in good 
governance agendas that aim to 'build' social capital. 
 
4.4 The Fa'asamoa as Civil Society and Social Capital 
 
Asked what the fa'asamoa meant in terms of knowledge of who you are and where you fit in, 
a senior orator (talking chief) claimed, when speaking of a situation in which someone has 
hit another person in their car and is confronted with that persons relatives: “But once you 
know these things, then you say: 'How about spare me for a few minutes. I come from... 
'Then you mention where you come from, then you mention those things, once you mention 
Malietoa ..... (chiefly title) ... People will stand up and say: 'If it was without that, we would 
kill you.' But now it is finished, thank you very much. Quite safe.”95 
In the above anecdote, the power of the ties that bind people together in Samoa are 
demonstrated, as well as the importance people place in those ties as a means of showing 
empathy to and trusting one another. It is an example of the benefits people derive form the 
social structure, whether it be the easily identifiable kinship ties, or the knowledge of ones 
place relative to others in society. These ties could be called 'affective ties'. Iati Iati describes 
the fa'asamoa as a system “strongly rooted upon affective ties”, which can be “defined as 
ties based on notions of kin, culture, ethnicity and others of a similar nature.”96 
Iati Iati writes about the fa'asamoa in relation to the good governance agenda for civil 
society. His description of the fa'asamoa as based on affective ties, which uphold and are 
created by the 'social cage' of the fa'amatai system stands in direct contrast, he argues, with 
proponents of a liberal view of civil society. The idea of affective ties and social cages are an 
anathema to liberal theorists, Iati Iati argues, who believe that such bonds are not helpful in 
terms of creating the right kind of democratic culture, that it does not represent the 'right' 
kind of social capital, or the 'right' kind of civil society. Iati Iati quotes Ernest Gellner in 
claiming that civil society should not include these “'segmentary communities, cousin-ridden 
and ritual ridden' that although may be free of central tyranny, were not free of a 'demanding 
culture that modern man would find intolerably stifling.'”97  
It is certainly true that many aspects of the fa'asamoa are inimical to commonly held 
conceptions of democratic practice, these range from institutionalised aspects of the 
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fa'asamoa that do not fit well with democratic theory, to experienced difficulties that have 
existed since the two systems have been forced to work alongside the other since the end of 
the colonial era. 
One of the things identified with the poor record of governance in the Pacific is the inability 
of executive governments to establish a good working relationship with civil society.98 That, 
in turn, leads to little accountability being demanded of the government, and added to 
associated democratic woes. Elise Huffer and Asofou So'o note the same thing in reference 
to the fa'asamoa. The interaction between the traditional forms of practice associated with 
fa'asamoa and fa'amatai and the executive government based on a liberal democratic (and 
bureaucratic) model has been less than perfect.99 They name discrimination, 
misunderstanding and malpractice among the resultant effects of this incomplete 
relationship.  
It is important to point out, while making the claim that the fa'asamoa is an important node 
of social capital and the good things that can flow from this in terms of democratic culture, 
that not all aspects of the fa'asamoa are 'good' or desired from a democratic point of view. 
This is obvious when looking at the provision for physical punishment, for instance, or the 
seemingly quite strict ascribed social roles. As the above has pointed out, the interaction 
between the fa'asamoa and the more western, democratic institutions of the central Samoan 
government has been, at times, fraught with difficulties.  
One issue in particular is that regarding gender and positions of authority. Although there is 
nothing in particular preventing females from attaining the rank of Matai, in practise it rarely 
occurs. The rank itself does not denote an individual (the rank belongs to the title), and it has 
no gender. But, as Stephanie Lawson points out, “ideal descriptions of socio-political 
structures... rarely coincide with reality.”100 Historically, as in other societies, instances of 
women attaining chiefly title have been rare.101 
These facts indicate that the fa'asamoa in many areas fails to embody democratic principles 
and that there are a number of reasons why observers would hesitate to include it among a 
list of civil society institutions. It could also be argued that with social ties bound up in 
kinship groups and held together with strict patterns of ritual and authority, the 'right' kind of 
social capital is not being created to facilitate a democratic culture on a national scale. It is 
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certainly not the kind of civil society or social capital that Robert Putnam wrote about.  
The fa'asamoa is not the same as civil society as seen through 'neo-toquevillian' eyes, that of 
dense civic associationalism. In a certain sense, the fa'asamoa could be seen as a vision of 
the 'good society' identified by Michael Edwards, in that it is an 'ideal type' of society where 
“tolerance, non-discrimination, non-violence, trust and cooperation are common 
denominators, along with freedom and democracy so long as these are not defined 
exclusively in western terms”.102 Certainly there are strong elements of democratic practice 
within the fa'asamoa, notably the often healthy democratic basis upon which Matai titles are 
chosen within the aiga. As stated above, this ideal system is often not borne out in practice 
(as aren't many democratic ideals even in western democracies), but the ideal exists as the 
basis of the institution.  
At the basis of the fa'asamoa are many key institutions which afford the fa'asamoa with 
much that is seen as essential to the role of civil society, even in the liberal tradition. The 
open settings in which discussion occurs and key decisions are made align with its role in 
interest aggregation and articulation. Publicity, or the public way in which discussions are 
held and debated is a key aspect of the fa'asamoa. Even the distribution of goods is a public 
act.103 
The public ways in which things are handled have often been remarked upon. As have the 
levels of transparency and accountability inherent within the system. Maulolo Leaula Tavita, 
for instance, praises the openness at the heart of the fa'asamoa, “Good governance is the 
heart of the ‘fa’asamoa’ (culture), transparency and accountability in the Samoan concept 
are pillars that play a critical part in the stability of Samoa....  All issues are brought before 
the village and discussed in the open for everyone to hear and also to comment on”104 
including chiefs, untitled men, and women. Accountability, in terms of village affairs is built 
into this ideal system, and civility and consensus are important precepts. There are many 
ways in which the fa'asamoa can be seen as an ideal type of a 'civil' society, aspects which 
have their origin not least in the fact of Samoa's size and isolation. These facts make it vital 
that the distribution of resources, for instance, is a publicly accountable act. 
Another very important point regarding the fa'asamoa as civil society lies in past successes 
in implementing governance strategies for particular issues. There have been past examples, 
where elements of the fa'amatai system were successfully utilised to effect change in the 
governance of health provision to the villages, acting as an important civil society partner, 
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with governance and service delivery roles. Iesu Kuresa was appointed by the New Zealand 
Health Services in the 1920's to oversee the creation of the Health and Sanitation 
Programme for the villages.105 He based the project on the faletua ma tausi and tamaiti, 
existing groups within the fa'asamoa structure (meaning the wives of matai, and children). 
The results led to an effective and sustainable programme that lasted for forty years. It 
looked after the “sanitation and beautification of Samoan villages and the health and welfare 
of mothers, infants and the whole community”.106 It was from this base that the National 
Council of Women grew. This is also a good example, like that stated above; of how the 
fa'amatai system is not adverse to change, and can accommodate new ideas and practices. 
In terms of social capital, the basis upon which liberal detractors might complain about the 
way the fa'asamoa works is also value laden. As has already been shown, social capital is as 
a contested topic as civil society. Although Samoan social institutions might be, as Gellner 
says, 'cousin-ridden', meaning too dependant on kinship ties, they are not more cousin ridden 
than James Coleman's description of diamond traders in New York. In that situation, familial 
ties enabled the enormous amounts of trust that was required for the effective running of the 
market and the information flows that the individuals required. Samoa is such a small polity 
it is hard to imagine people trying to ignore the social effect that kinship ties have, and the 
social capital generated from these ties is no less important. Speaking about remittances, Iati 
Iati notes that the 'emotional and social foundations' that this system is based on, which are 
in turn centred on affective ties, are ways in which Samoans may 'elicit assistance' through 
kinship ties.107 Using a context-dependant approach as in the work of James Coleman, it is 
easy to see how access to various forms of social capital permeates the fa'asamoa and the 
affective ties upon which it is based. The structured networks based on affective ties, 
assigned roles, and obligations provide a context within which individuals find social 
support, assistance, and a platform from which to assess specific issues and pursue agendas. 
Although the basis of the ties that bind the networks together are different, the networks 
themselves are very present.  
Speaking of crucial differences between Samoan and Western forms of social capital, 
Rochelle Stewart-Withers and Anthony O' Brian remarked that membership in social capital 
networks in Samoa is 'obligation-driven and conceptual rather than rule driven and specific, 
such as occurs in western democracies'.108 This may well be the major difference. From a 
liberal point of view social capital may seem limited in Samoa because it is unrecognisable. 
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It must be looked at within the context of Samoan society, and the benefits that membership 
within the fa'asamoa system bring come to the fore. Then it is possible to see why such 
remarkable levels of trust and reciprocity exist within the system such as was apparent in the 
anecdote at the beginning of this section. Reciprocity, in particular, is a very important 
element of the fa'asamoa. Its importance is seen to derive from both Samoan cultural 
tradition and Christian value systems.109 Although slightly more formalised than the kind of 
reciprocity Putnam described and felt was such an important aspect of social capital, it 
shares much that is similar. On who is rendered a favour (i.e. a service or a gift) “takes on a 
responsibility to repay it in the future. The exact debt incurred is unspecified and neither the 
form nor the amount of the repayment is specified at the time it is incurred”.110 This bears 
close resemblance to Putnam's idea of 'generalised reciprocity', i.e. the sense that one good 
turn deserves another. This was key to his vision of a society strong in social capital. 
The trust generated within the structure of the fa'asamoa is, as stated above, obligation 
driven rather than rule driven, making it different to that form of trust described by Putnam. 
Kenneth Newton describes this type of trust as “thick” trust. It is common to many small 
“face to face” communities. It is also common in societies with more 'direct' forms of 
political participation, such as the fa'asamoa, largely generated by day to day contact.111 
Some of the benefits afforded to individuals within the fa'asamoa structure become apparent 
when focusing on the fact that the fa'asamoa has strongly recreated itself in the major nodes 
of Samoan immigration. An example of this is the fa'a Aukilani (the Auckland way), a 
variant on the fa'asamoa structure that has developed among immigrant Samoan families in 
Auckland. This structure has been described as more 'liberal' than that in Samoa as it has had 
to establish itself within the context of another overarching culture. Melani Anae quotes an 
island-born Matai now living in New Zealand saying: “They [our parents] were bought up in 
the fa'asamoa but they also looked at the western ways and they adapted their lifestyles... we 
picked up the stuff that was suitable for us so we still have the traditional fa'aSamoa 
upbringing but we were also exposed to the fa'aPalagi...”112 Despite this, the fundamental 
elements of the fa'asamoa remain, with kinship ties remaining very important. The kinship 
ties and the social capital derived from those ties become strongly apparent in the context of 
Samoan individuals who emigrate to Auckland or California and find a familiar social 
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structure waiting for them and all the advantages that come with that. For newly arrived 
migrants in an international urban setting, the “Samoan cultural system provides a 
framework for interpreting urban life and organizing social relations.”113 This occurs in 
much the same way as immigrant communities around the world recreate social structures in 
alien cultures (such as the many 'Chinatowns' in cities around the world) which include 
social capital networks that help newly arrived immigrants on social and economic levels, as 
well as acting as a 'transition' point between the two cultures. 
Samoans, through their shared cultural experience within the system known as fa'asamoa, 
share strong social capital networks. The 'affective ties' that this system is based on, allow 
Samoans to elicit assistance from one another and gain support from a strong social bedrock. 
On top of this, it has been seen in this section that a strong sense of interpersonal trust is 
prevalent within the fa'asamoa (as demonstrated by the anecdote given at the beginning of 
this section) and an obligation-driven senses of trust and reciprocity. Both of these norms 
were identified in the first chapter as critically important, in Robert Putnam's view, to a 
society with high levels of social capital. Yet what is perhaps more important is the strong 
community organisation, based on civility and openness, which provides a very strong social 
network. The fa'asamoa is not a voluntary organisation, and the norms that it creates are not 
exactly the same as those described by Putnam. The fa'asamoa is based on affective ties, and 
its norms are obligation driven. Even so, seeing it as a dense social network allows us to see 
these norms for what they are, as a strong form of social capital. The next section will look 
at some of the normative concepts and values behind the fa'asamoa. 
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4.5 Pacific Thought 
 
Although much has been written about the fa'asamoa, most of it has been to do with how 
it reacts with various modern institutions. Not very much attention has been paid to the 
principles which underlie the fa'asamoa. These are important in much the same way as 
liberal theory is in describing the ideal roles of civil society and social capital in adding 
to the democratic life of a polity. Recently, a small body of work has emerged which is 
concerned with Pacific thought, and the underlying principles behind traditional Pacific 
institutions. This kind of investigation goes hand in hand with an approach looking at 
'indigenous epistemologies', or trying to trace indigenous ways of thought or to identify 
an indigenous dialogue on issues such as development. Academic investigation in this 
area is occurring across the pacific in many different countries. Largely, over the last 
thirty years, most of the literature in this area has been exploring the relationship 
between Pacific thought and introduced religion, namely, Christianity. Although there 
exist parallels between the two systems of thought, “they mainly show that... 
Christianity cannot survive without integrating existing fundamental values of local 
societies”.114 This is not the only area they explore, however. At times the subject of 
social capital has been approached. In Fiji, Ropate Qalo studied the concept of Vaka 
Viti, a concept similar to fa'asamoa, it means “the ‘Fijian Way’ or Fijian rationality... as it 
is understood by ethnic Fijians”115 and the ways in which it can be seen as social capital. 
In his exploration, Qalo makes no value judgement based on a 'type' of social capital. In 
fact, he warns against this kind of separation, stating: “Our Pacific social capital is being 
foolishly, naively or arrogantly ignored or have been pushed aside in our present life-world 
because of a lack of a meaningful appreciation of our own civilization.” This suggests that 
the 'individualist' aspect of western culture, including the particular notion of social capital 
and civil society based around associationalism, is seen as a threat to traditional forms of 
social capital in the Pacific. Qalo goes on to say: “Basically, in my view, the friendliness in 
the islands, the respect for elders, the sea, the woods or nature and kinship, emanate from a 
natural attitude peculiar to our life-world then and now, but slowly it is being eroded 
through individualism. Fellow islanders will recognize similar patterns and trends in their 
own islands as in the Fa’a Samoa, Wantokism, Faka Niue, I Kiribati and so on”.  
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This suggests that the values inherent in the Vaka-Viti and other Pacific thought-systems 
including the fa'asamoa are less individualist than western ones, but that they themselves 
constitute important social-capital networks. It also suggests that these important social 
capital networks are under threat from western ways of being and are being currently, 
largely ignored. This includes the major development donors, and their civil society 
strategies for social capital building and good governance. 
But what are the underlying elements of the fa'asamoa that are the basis of the system 
itself?  
As stated above, reciprocity is a key element of the fa'asamoa, both as an obligation-
driven part of everyday social custom, but also at a deeper normative level. The term 
fa'alaolao (respect) literally refers to “two people facing each other in a soothing 
relationship, [and it] implies a balance and reciprocity between all (traditional) political 
entities engaging with each other.” 116 Along with the concepts of Mamalu (dignity) and 
Alofa (compassion, and love), it upholds many traditional institutions such as feagaiga, 
the respectful relationship between brother and sister, but which also has referred to the  
relationship between the political aspects of traditional Samoan society, in particular the 
councils (fono) with decision making power.  
It is important also to make a note of the inherent egalitarianism of Samoan society. It 
could be said that in systems where kinship structures are so important, they are 
necessarily hierarchically ordered, without much room for individual movement within 
that structure. The first point here is that Matai are accorded the same respect, and that 
every Aiga has a Matai. Therefore every Aiga group has the same respect and 
representation. As has already been stated, Matai titles are open to all members of the 
Aiga, with service to the Aiga being the main pre-requisite. It is also true that there is no 
class distinction, and that in “classificatory terminology” everyone is either the 'son' or 
'daughter' of a chief, which means that “no member of an aiga is expected to defer to a 
member of another aiga, even when that other is of higher status”.117 Huffer and So'o 
also point out that the institutions of liberal democracy developed in societies that were 
riven with class inequalities, and those institutions were designed to break those apart 
(e.g universal suffrage), whereas the Samoan context is very different. What was 
essentially an egalitarian society developed institutions with different purposes in mind, 
when universal suffrage came to Samoa, it bought with it those other inequalities that 
are still debated in western democracies, such as wealth inequality and its effects on 
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political processes.118 
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4.6 Conclusion  
 
 
Within the affective ties, the kinship based networks and the shared experience of 
cultural practice, a strong type of social capital exists within the fa'asamoa. There exist 
strong cultural institutions through which individual Samoans may elicit assistance from 
one another, and strong networks which act to bind people together. These act to create 
very high levels of trust and reciprocity in Samoan society. It is not just these elements 
however, the fa'asamoa is based on values and norms which align with its role as a fount 
of social capital. 
Given the good governance agenda, and the important role placed on civil society as a 
node and a creator of social capital, it makes sense that more can be done within the 
structure of the fa'asamoa itself. As already noted, many of the major problems relating 
to governance in Samoa arise in the undefined area between modern government 
institutions and traditional forms of authority within the fa'asamoa as it is that authority 
that most people most readily understand. The difference between modern, urban NGO's 
and traditional nodes of community action may be seen in the same light.  
The historical example above is a good demonstration of the important role that the 
fa'asamoa can play in Samoa's development and governance in key areas. In utilising the 
already existing social networks, a sustainable and successful health strategy was put in 
place. The fa'asamoa, because of these strong networks and values, has great potential in 
terms of collective action and positively affecting better governance outcomes. 
Good governance donors cannot neglect the role the fa'asamoa plays in the social and 
political lives of Samoans. They cannot simply fund the development of a familiar form 
of civil society to achieve (among other things) the facilitation of social capital along 
certain lines. What this chapter has attempted to demonstrate, is a basis upon which 
donors might begin to see the fa'asamoa in a positive light as an important aspect of 
Samoan civil society, and the source of important social capital that is so vital to 
fostering good governance practices in every aspect of society. 
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Chapter Five: Conclusion 
 
 
This thesis has argued that the governance agenda for civil society is, to an extent, flawed. 
The theoretical genesis of the agenda draws its inspiration from culturally and historically 
specific values. Liberal Western theory regarding the role of civil society, its three sector 
approach, and it's assumptions based on the observances of Alexis d'Tocqueville, Robert 
Putnam and theorists like him, identify current ideas about civil society within a very 
specific cultural frame.  
Added to this is the observed effects of civil society funding on the ground. Due to political 
realities, CSO's must organise themselves along certain bureaucratic lines in order to gain a 
funding relationship with government and other accountable donors. The negative 
externalities of this new class of professionally organised NGO's have been observed in 
many parts of the developing world, including Africa, and Bangladesh. 
A key problem is that this new form of civil society can be seen to undermine the state, and 
therefore have a destabilising effect, but also traditional practices and even traditional forms 
of civil society. It has been seen that NGO's often respond more to the needs of the donors 
rather than forge their own institutional identity, and even the proliferation of NGO's can to 
some extent crowd out genuine grassroots movements. While they may be fulfilling roles 
that liberal theory ascribes to them, they may be having actually harmful effects on a more 
genuine and culturally appropriate movements, networks, nodes of social capital, and 
ultimately, paths to better governance objectives. The 'adaptive prescription' viewpoint is the 
more appropriate model for viewing the relevance of civil society in the developing world. It 
doesn't discount the importance of civil society in achieving wider governance objectives, 
but realises that our view of civil society must expand beyond narrow culturally specific 
precepts. 
Implicit within this argument is the need to reformulate ideas about civil society and social 
capital. The liberal conception is but one approach. We could, for instance, view the 
example presented in this thesis, the fa'asamoa, as an example of the 'good society', or an 
ideal type of society such as that theoretical avenue described by Michael Edwards. Also, 
much is gained by breaking apart Putnam's conception of social capital. If we discard the 
idea that only voluntary associative organisations can be the arena in which people learn the 
values important to better democratic governance, we can critically assess such forms of 
traditional civil society without an inherent liberal bias. It has been seen that the fa'asamoa 
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does in fact facilitate many of the norms that Putnam found so important including (albeit 
slightly altered forms of) trust and reciprocity. The norms inherent in the fa'asamoa resemble 
more the idea of “thick trust” as described by Kenneth Newton.  
In Samoa, working with the fa'asamoa and the already existing community structure and 
social capital networks, is a more culturally appropriate way of achieving better governance 
results, than simply funding a separate NGO class to achieve such ends. It has already been 
pointed out that historically, such a strategy was successful when looking for leadership on 
village health issues. In the already existing networks of the faletua ma tausi, social 
resources were utilised and a successful mobilisation occurred around a common goal. This 
is not to say that, for instance, international NGO's do not do good work, but that lasting, 
sustainable and successful change is more likely working alongside already existing civil 
society, and already existing social capital networks. 
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